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INTRODUCTION
The current model of corporate governance needs reform. There is mounting evidence that the practices of 
shareholder primacy drive company directors and executives to adopt the same short time horizon as financial 
markets. Pressure to meet the demands of the financial markets drives stock buybacks, excessive dividends 
and a failure to invest in productive capabilities. The result is a tragedy of the horizon, with corporations 
and their shareholders failing to consider environmental, social or even their own, long-term, economic 
sustainability.1
The urgent need to address adverse impacts and risks produced by and associated with this model is 
reflected in the Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation issued by the Business Roundtable in the US, the 
Purpose Letter issued by Larry Fink, CEO of Blackrock, comments by the Governor of the Bank of England 
and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board Mark Carney, as well as in the corporate governance codes in 
the Netherlands and South Africa and the Loi PACTE in France.
The Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth recently presented by the European Commission responds 
to this urgent need by setting out an ambitious agenda to develop integrated reforms in the areas of 
sustainable finance, directors duties, and corporate reporting with the aims of: addressing the root causes of 
short-termism in capital markets and corporate governance; correcting the failure of relevant actors to manage 
the financial risks associated with climate change; and moving business towards greater sustainability.2 
Whilst recognizing that many corporate governance issues still remain to be addressed, the signatories to 
this statement express their support for the Action Plans goal of making corporate governance practice 
significantly more sustainable and focused on the long term. In order to contribute to the development of this 
agenda, the signatories of this statement put forward the following key proposals.
Corporate Governance 
for Sustainability
Statement
ǋ Directors duties are one way in which company directors can be held accountable for how they carry 
out their critical corporate governance functions of developing the companys strategy, overseeing its 
operations, and accounting for its performance. Therefore directors duties are often considered as a 
possible method of steering company directors towards the long term interests of companies.5
ǋ The underlying idea is that directors could potentially use their discretion under (some variant of) the 
business judgement rule that exists in every major jurisdiction, and that gives directors discretion to act 
in what they believe to be in the best interests of the company as a separate entity. In principle, this 
rule can accommodate either a long- or short-term approach. Hence, where directors pursue the goal 
of maximising short-term shareholder value, it is a product not of legal obligation, but of the pressures 
imposed on them by financial markets, activist shareholders, the threat of hostile takeover and/or stock-
based compensation schemes.6 
ǋ These strong pressures from outside company law mean the problem of short-termism cannot be solved 
simply by requiring or permitting directors to have regard to sustainability and the companys long-term 
interest.
ǋ In order to: counteract the pressures imposed on directors by financial markets to maximise short-term 
shareholder value; increase director accountability; and ensure a proper consideration of corporate long-
term interests and sustainability risks, we recommend that:
 › directors should be subject to a legally-binding obligation to develop, disclose and implement, 
on behalf of the company, a forward-looking corporate sustainability strategy that identifies and 
addresses material environmental and social issues and significant impacts connected to the 
companys business model, operations and supply chain.
 › whilst directors should have discretion as regards identifying which issues are material for the 
corporate sustainability strategy, the law should clarify that the purpose of requiring companies to 
produce such a strategy is to ensure respect for the planetary boundaries and human rights,7 as well 
as integration of ESG considerations into all aspects of the companys operations. In order to ensure 
that the strategy covers relevant matters, the law should specify a limited set of sector-specific issues 
and public objectives that should be addressed on a comply or explain basis.8
 › a specified percentage of the KPIs and remuneration of executive management should be linked 
to the achievement of measurable targets set in the companys sustainability strategy9 (and national 
remuneration disclosure laws should be amended to require publication of these matters).
Sustainable 
Finance
ǋ Sustainable corporate governance requires a financial market in which there is a critical mass of investors 
willing to invest in companies that implement long-term sustainability plans, even at the expense of short-
term returns. Yet executives are under pressure (and have powerful incentives) to focus on short-term 
issues rather than sustainability, whilst institutional investors report that they too are constrained by an 
institutional setting that prioritises short-term shareholder value.3
ǋ In order to overcome these constraints, a legal obligation to consider, identify and disclose Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) risks should be imposed at every level of the investment chain, including 
upon institutional investors and asset managers.
ǋ Such reforms should be complemented by changes to company law that require boards of directors to 
develop, disclose and implement a corporate sustainability strategy.4 Rules relating to corporate disclosures 
should also be reformed with the aim of improving the quality and comparability of the non-financial 
information provided to shareholders and other stakeholders about key sustainability risks. In what follows 
we make suggestions as to how this could be done.
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ǋ In order to ensure directors accountability for this responsibility, we recommend that: 
 › the board should be required to include in the corporate sustainability strategy verifiable targets and a 
commitment to making sufficient resources available to management.
 › the board should be mandated to discuss and sign off on an annual progress report, which should 
be included in the companys non-financial report.
 › a non-executive committee, composed of independent experts and chaired by a designated non-
executive director, should be set up and tasked with monitoring and reviewing the content and 
implementation of the sustainability strategy.10
 › non-executive directors should have a duty of care to monitor the implementation of the strategy.
 › failure to implement the corporate sustainability strategy should be considered a breach of executive 
directors duty of good faith (where deliberate) or duty of care (where accidental11), and could be 
enforced by the shareholders by derivative action where the failure causes long-term harm to the 
company.
 › a national regulatory body should be empowered to bring proceedings against the executive 
directors where non-implementation has caused serious harm to third parties or unlawful harm to the 
environment.12
ǋ The function of corporate non-financial reporting is to allow the companys shareholders and other 
stakeholders to make informed investment and engagement decisions by providing information on the 
companys social and environmental risks and impacts, and on the implications of such risks and impacts 
for the companys development.
ǋ Since 2018, the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) has required large companies, banks and 
insurers to disclose non-financial information. However, an abundance of standards and the flexibility 
accorded to reporting entities means that, whilst reports are often lengthy, they are neither comprehensive 
nor sufficiently comparable.13
ǋ The standardisation of non-financial reporting is indispensable for the development of sustainable finance, 
for effective monitoring of companies implementation of their corporate sustainability strategies, and for 
enforcement of directors duties. Therefore, we recommend that the rules relating to corporate disclosures 
should:
 › clarify that information on sustainability matters should be disclosed if it is material either from a 
financial or from a social and environmental perspective.14
 › stipulate minimum general and sector-specific requirements for form and content of disclosures. 
Minimum requirements should be imposed in relation to, inter alia, climate change-related targets, 
strategies and performance, and the results of environmental and human rights due diligence 
covering supply chains.15
CONCLUSION
Current corporate governance practice is contributing to a wide range of systemic risks, as well as 
devastating social, environmental and economic impacts.16 With less than a decade left17 in which to address 
the catastrophic threat of climate change, and with investors, companies, accountants, policymakers and 
academics expressing a shared sense of urgency, now is the time to act to reform corporate governance. 
The signatories to this Statement call on all those concerned about climate change and sustainability to work 
together to support and implement the proposals in this statement and to contribute to the achievement of the 
EC Action Plans goals.
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